

# Tectonics and The Space of Communicativity

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It is a logical corollary to post-modernity's skepticism, that architecture's role, privileged since the Renaissance to make generalising plans for society in general, should be called into question. Let us remember Lyotard's optimism, that "invention is always born of dissension"<sup>1</sup>. However, we must also be wary of post modernity's skepticism. It might lead to an ideological revolution where we simply supplant materialism for idealism, where either the utilitarian or sensual experience is promoted to the denial of meaning. This would be a denial of architecture's representational character and therefore a denial of its contingent relation to regimes of power, politics and philosophy. We must also be wary of simply asserting the worth of fragmentation and collision as the empty rhetoric of a new political dynamics of resistance. This could have the outcome of solipsism, which if not an outright dismissal, certainly is a sublimation of the everyday conditions of co-existence in the life-world. To be sure, in post-modernity it might be difficult to understand what is architecture's role, indeed what it represents. For some, architecture, or building that promotes itself as architecture, especially bombastically to the eclipse of all else, stands already as a symbol of the old orders. It is therefore, and perhaps rightly, despised<sup>2</sup> (figure 1). However, we may still discover an ethical dimension to fragmentation and difference and re-think the role of architecture within these terms. We can re-think architecture's representational role, and discover that cultural interrelation and cultural correspondence can intercede in conditions of cultural collision.

## TECTONICS — THE LINGUISTIC TURN

In recognition of the communicative and representational character of architecture, tectonics will be taken through a similar re-orientation to that which the linguistic turn has given Western philosophy<sup>3</sup>. To think



Fig. 1. Frank O. Gehry, Guggenheim, Bilbao, 1991-97.

tectonics in this way already invokes proximity to word language. The architectural theorists Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas declared the production of architecture as the production of knowledge. They also speculated into architectural semiotics, thus making direct links between the themes of power, knowledge and language<sup>4</sup>. Many other architects followed their lead, usually either as proponents of Architectural Structuralism or Historical Post Modernism<sup>5</sup>. However, there is a fundamental difference between what Gandelsonas and Agrest initiated and what followed. Gandelsonas and Agrest proposed no mere linguistic analogy, but began, albeit tacitly, a speculation into the possibility of architectural linguistics. Their position operates through a linguistic turn, considering architecture as a particular knowledge, as a particular mode of discourse<sup>6</sup>.

The difference between the 'analogs' and those investigating architectural linguistics rests in the attitude towards how one participates in society with language. Architectural linguistics allows for the language of architecture to develop its own operations and structures that are not necessarily those of word

language. The 'analogists' apply traditional linguistic models to architecture. They accept pre-determined systems of relation between language and architecture. In other words- linguistics, as a pre-determined knowledge base, provides the metaphysical and meta-linguistic foundation for all architectural productivity. To merely analogise leaves architectural production to the mercy of the power structures and models of knowledge already embedded in the structures of word language. Quite differently, architectural linguistics has its own dealings with language. It deals with the principles of communication directly and in accordance with architecture's own specificity.


The question of architectural specificity will be raised again in the context of the 'space of communicativity'. However, for the moment, the contingency between tectonics and architectural language will be considered further. Almost thirty years after her initial speculations into semiotics, Diana Agrest proposes in her commentary on Stan Allen's essays on "Practice, Architecture, Technique and Representation", that representation can "be thought of as the place of articulation between architectural practice and theory"<sup>7</sup>. In other words, architecture triggers processes of articulation because of its representational nature and this gives rise to theorising 'through' architecture. Agrest also states that "architecture is produced in three different registers, through three different texts: drawing, writing, and building"<sup>8</sup>. She goes on to speak of the uncertain nature of representation in each text. She says that what a drawing represents "exceeds its purely notational function". Writing betrays an unconscious because there is always doubt between "the representation [the writing] and that of what really is being represented". Allying herself to Derrida, but as much to Lacan and Freud, the implication is that in all text there are further possible readings "disguised if not repressed". In building even though there is a correlation between drawing and building and what the drawing and building both represent, a building has "other referents . . . it detaches itself from the represented object to become self-referential". That is, not only does a building represent itself, but is also representational in its own terms. In summary, representation is by no means clear, direct or absolutely limited.

Agrest doesn't account in detail for the nature of the uncertainty and the paradox that gives rise to what can be called representational crisis (and therefore how in fact we can theorise through architecture). She allows the essays of Stan Allen to fill the gaps in her commentary of them. He takes us on enjoyable journeys along many of the curious paths the flux in representation has enabled to be drawn, traced, and mapped. He describes

them well calling on much post-modern philosophy, but always filters them finally through the object building. The finality of a building, the physicality of a building, the historical significance of any building, ultimately seems to hold sway over any incidental interpretation. He never seems to liberate tectonic expressiveness. He speaks only about "clarity of tectonic expression"<sup>9</sup>. It seems that Pragmatism gets too easily grounded by the intransigence of convention to go off on hermeneutic flights of fancy. As Allen states, for many "the discipline [architecture] retains a Ruskinian concept of morality that holds the trick [of representation] under suspicion"<sup>10</sup>. Even though many systems of knowledge have succumbed to decrepitude over the 100 years between Ruskin and Allen, it seems time has not removed the traditional moral imperative from Allen's architectural practice. A linguistic turn in the thinking of tectonics will prove illuminating to the uncertainty in the workings of representation. Furthermore, it will provide means to breach the traditional impasse in the theory/practice relationship, and emancipation from the yoke of Platonist morality such that it can be further extrapolated into a more pertinent ethical architectural practice for post-modern culture.

Returning to architecture's three registers, it is easy to understand how drawing, writing and building have their own tectonics. Whether drawing, writing or building, we can think of them as arrangements articulated through the interrelation of different things, media, activities, styles, techniques-be it "cutting from solids" or "joining of parts", systems, structures, machinations and junctions<sup>11</sup> (figures 2-3). This is tectonic expression. The signs arising from all these differences are complex. To ask for clarity of tectonic expression demands too much. Drawings, writings and buildings may be thought of in terms of Deleuze's and Guattari's "abstract machine" or "diagram"<sup>12</sup>. Drawings have abstract qualities and are multipliers or producers of meaning. Writing follows the codes of word language and has its own complexities, its own "regime of signs"<sup>13</sup>. As we know, writing can also be abstract. Building already begins a translation from drawing, writing and thinking. It already begins to "index" its signs. It begins to territorialise its signs, and this is why tectonics often becomes territorialised as building construction. However, there can never be direct translation between different sign regimens, because meaning is always conditioned by the tectonics of a language. Tectonics is the very mechanics of meaning.

In short, cutting through the whole semiotic project, structuralist and post-structuralist, we might see tectonics as we see text, as articulation of difference. It is through coming to terms with their tectonics that we



Figs. 2 & 3. *The Tectonics of Drawing*, Jessam Al-Jawad, University of Edinburgh, 2002.

can read drawings, writings and buildings. It is because drawings, writings and buildings work with 'different things, media, activities, styles, techniques-be it cutting from solids or joining of parts, systems, structures, machinations and junctions' that we can say they have language. We can read their signs through their very fundamental operation of difference, even to suggest that drawings, writings and buildings speak to us. Language is the articulation of difference. In this sense we can also say that language is construction. Derrida's whole Deconstruction project depends upon it. If we think again on the association of construction and tectonics, not only should we not simply restrict tectonics to building construction, in a certain sense, tectonics and construction must be considered the same. We can see that tectonics is not so much incidental to the notion of architectural language as the basis of it.

Therefore, if tectonics is the basis of architectural language, it is also the generator of representational crisis. From this formulation it is possible to begin speculation into how tectonics might deal with the apparent paradox of uncertainty in representation, to come to terms with the impasse between traditional oppositions. Tectonics can come between theory and practice, idealism and materialism, art and architecture, architecture and building, the grand and ordinary, the figurative and abstract, and can even pave the way for an ethical practice. Tectonics articulates difference. This is not merely conceptual difference or categorical difference preconceived as differences. As both Heidegger and Derrida testify in their own ways, before we have the same there is difference<sup>14</sup>. This is as much a linguistic issue as a cultural issue. It is an ontological issue. Difference is the fundamental condition of co-existence. We are all different from one another, and this can be perceived, felt, thought, and articulated. The

difference constructed or articulated into language remains in the language. It may be effaced, erased or obscured, but it never disappears entirely and it is this difference, ontological difference, that allows us to read something, anything, into any language, architectural language, even though we might know little of it.

It is also this difference that generates the uncertainty and flux in representation. The grasping and arrangement of difference that takes place in any reading operates in the representational flux between intended meaning and imagined meaning. We might now understand the full value of Heidegger's exhortation to see the etymological root of technique, technology, and tectonics, *techné*, as a revealing, a bringing forth<sup>15</sup>. We can also see that the theorising Agrest might have in mind is not necessarily theory pre-determined as such, but theory as it is 'revealed' through the reading of architecture, 'brought forth' by articulating tectonics. To think that tectonics could provide for this interpretive freedom is marvelous. Then, we can say that tectonics is not so much the language of construction as language in construction.

#### THE SPACE OF COMMUNICATIVITY

Prior to delving a little deeper into the ethical question, it should be noted that the question of tectonics as language has been posed before. However, it appears not to have been developed very far as a question into ethics. For example, in his essay *Tectonic Masks*, Sandro Marpiello is very complimentary about the tectonic expressiveness of two buildings by two different architects-the *Woolworth Conservatory Library*, Princeton University, by Juan Navarro Baldeweg (figure 4), and

the *Chapel of St. Ignatius*, Seattle University, by Steven Holl (figure 5)<sup>16</sup>. Marpirello regards Baldeweg's own description as the tectonic language of the building. Baldeweg's tectonic borrows from the language of "cloth . . . whose physical qualities refer to surface, texture, colour, warp, and its laws of formation"<sup>17</sup>. With regard to Holl's building, as well as Holl's own reference to "bottles of light", Marpirello invokes Catherine Vasseleu's description of light as a tectonic. The suggestion is that light has a language, it is a material that can be constructed, fabricated. Light has "weft and warp . . . light is fabrication, a surface of depth that also spills over and passes through the interstices of the fabric"<sup>18</sup>.



Fig. 4. Juan Navarro Baldeweg, *The Woolworth Conservatory Library*, 1997.

In these two projects, building construction has been taken to a boundary where its terms are questioned by another language. There is no doubt; these buildings are very sensuous, even beautiful. They certainly seem to have benefited by tectonic crossovers between building and cloth and building and light. They certainly seem to promote an interesting reading of architec-



Fig. 5. Steven Holl, *Chapel of St. Ignatius*, Seattle University, 1994-97.

tural language. However, how easy is it to read further into these projects? How easy is it for other interpretations to be revealed and brought forth? Do these crossovers produce such dominating metaphors and 'techniques' that nothing can be seen beyond their own "regime of visualisation"<sup>19</sup>? Perhaps their tectonics merely makes the first re-orienting maneuver of a linguistic turn. The danger is that tectonics becomes subsumed by another language to no longer articulate difference, to promote only a particular system of difference, a particular 'sign regimen'. Perhaps this danger is more acute given the specific context of each building. A university campus is a very territorialised condition and can be a very rarefied circumstance. It is difficult to avoid deliberately poeticising tectonics from the outset of making a project when the building is promoted as object, when it negotiates no political difference, and limits its enquiry to an interiority of circumstances. They seem to have turned technique as tactic into strategy, and consequently promoted an overall aesthetic protocol.

It seems these projects have not questioned their own existence, or that of the circumstances of their existence. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger, prior to settling on the term *Dasein*, used an even more provocative phrase for the orientation of his work. Heidegger initially proposed doing a "Hermeneutics of Facticity"<sup>20</sup>. In other words, doing an interpretation of existence. This seems to suggest that Heidegger was promoting the pursuit of a paradox. As existence simply 'is', there seems to be nothing to interpret. However, consideration of this apparent paradox quickly reveals the single most important fact of existence—existence is never a singular existence. There is always the 'other'.

This is where Levinas picks up Heidegger's theme. Levinas speaks more of proximity, and is concerned with

“the proximity of person to person, the proximity of one’s neighbour or the welcome we prepare for one another”<sup>21</sup>. Levinas suggests that political relations should begin with a mutual bestowing of rights between individuals. This politic is founded on the observation that no matter how vigorous and repetitive the oscillation of exchange in the thinking of the mind of the subject or between different subjects, there is always an irreducible uniqueness of an individual. Although this uniqueness can never be described fully, it can be encountered again and again as an effect. Levinas’s insights are based on the fact of this uniqueness being identified, rather than identifying the differences<sup>22</sup>. In so much as this interiority of an individual is utterly ungraspable as a totality, it can be said that it is an inside that sits outside the subject. Even when specific differences are grasped and dragged inside, they can only ever be fragments of this outside, and in their fragmented condition must always serve to remind us as an example of our inability to totalise either interiority or exteriority.



This ‘otherness’ of the self for Levinas can be the basis of an ethical and political practice. The appeal to the commonality of ‘otherness’ enables a respect for the ‘Other’ from the outset of any engagement, a respect because no relationship is ever pre-conditioned, to the effect of being pre-judged, through the accounts of any interior. It would be erroneous to see this condition of duality at the core of an individual as an inside-outside harmonious balance of opposites that make up the self. Levinas describes a vigorous oscillating dynamic to the inside-outside dichotomy. To illustrate the conditions and complexity of the dynamic we might imagine a dichotomy in and between two individuals. They are not known to each, therefore, there is unpredictability in the exchange they are to embark upon. This need not be fearful to either conversant as the exchange process can begin by an appeal to ‘otherness’. In fact, it is the very unknown aspect of the exchange that triggers an appeal to the ‘otherness’ that sits outside both of them, and us all. Imagining we are one of those in the exchange, at this point not only do we trigger an inside-outside oscillating dynamic in ourselves, we might imagine the same dynamic in the other. The inside outside dynamic is very complex, because the exchange process loops its way between alternating inside and outside conditions-of self, ‘otherness’, imagined other self, and imagined other ‘otherness’.

Now it seems that Derrida is very critical of Levinas’ dichotomy of inside and outside<sup>23</sup>. He suggests that this dichotomy is a Platonist conception, as it were, the founding principle for traditional western Metaphysics, and something that Levinas himself wishes to reject.

However, this criticism seems to have encouraged Levinas to offer a more distinctive operation to his understanding of ‘the other’. The exchange between Derrida and Levinas seems to have been based on how each read Heidegger and extended from his phenomenological project, respectively either deconstructing philosophy or reconstructing philosophy. “The essential point of Derrida’s argument consists in recognizing that philosophical discourse can only say the Other in the language of the Same’, and this can be taken to summarize Derrida’s dilemma as much as that of Levinas. In his essay on Levinas, Derrida is also describing the fundamental aporia of deconstruction, unable to be fully inside or outside its host discourse, determined in its habits of thought by that which it rejects.”<sup>24</sup>

Levinas respects Derrida’s project in the way that he respects Heidegger’s project. “The greatest virtue of philosophy is that it can put itself in question, try to deconstruct what it has constructed, and unsay what it has said.”<sup>25</sup> However, Levinas’ project is not entirely philosophical. Unlike Derrida, for whom there is nothing outside<sup>26</sup> (of the text), Levinas sees philosophy as a language regime and wishes for it to step outside its own traditional territories. Levinas maintains, “against Heidegger, that philosophy can be ethical as well as ontological”<sup>27</sup>. He is “trying to show that man’s ethical relation to the other is ultimately prior to his ontological relation to himself (egology) or to the totality of things that we call the world (cosmology).”<sup>28</sup> Levinas’ position is political, because “the ethical relationship with the other becomes political”<sup>29</sup>.

To explain further, Levinas borrows extensively from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, which also departs from Heidegger in a significant way. Simplifying, illustrating the difference between pure philosophy and political philosophy, where Heidegger’s “primary concern is to clarify the nature and structures of *being* . . . Merleau-Ponty intends instead to clarify the nature and the structures of the *world*.”<sup>30</sup> In their considerations of the experienced world and following on from Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas saw the need to disturb the two predominant currents of modern western thinking, intellectualism (idealist, rationalist or realist) and empiricism. Intellectualism and empiricism deem that “the identity of things should bear the identity of their meaning”. In other words, the world is discussed as though “understanding would be equivalent to perceiving”<sup>31</sup>. For Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, Heidegger’s *Dasein* provides the initial impetus into the question of relation between individual and the world. *Dasein* exhorts us to unpick how our understanding has stitched and continues to stitch up the world. In other



Figs. 6. & 7. Bernard Tschumi, *Parc La Villette, Paris, 1985.*

words, *Dasein* illustrates the unstable relation between understanding and perception. *Dasein* provides for a world of things and a world of people liberated from any particular political pre-determinism.

However, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas ultimately have a concern over a seeming limitation in Heidegger's *Dasein*. Even though "*Dasein* is in-the-world primarily 'with others'<sup>32</sup>, it seems as though the perception of the perceiver is privileged over any other. It seems that Heidegger's *Dasein* is a "being-with" only in so much that it is also a "being-against". Thus, Heidegger's 'philosophy' is guilty of a solipsistic intellectualism, by either excluding the political or by seeing politics through the same paradigm of opposition which privileges one view over another. Thus, there is an issue as to whether the authentic view, the view of the liberated perceiver, is in fact authentic, or even ethical! "To refuse one's determination by the world in the fullest sense of the word is only another form of refusing to be in-the-world."<sup>33</sup>

Therefore, Levinas aligns himself with Merleau-Ponty and brings his theory of the 'Other' as a theory of *Dasein* re-worked from a concern for a social, political and ethical practice. Levinas' 'other', *autrui*, "is not destined to appear, and is foreign to any 'place in the sun'." However, "the Other occupies its place fully, insisting on the subject's removal from its own manifestation."<sup>34</sup> In other words, the Other is an imagined other, who manages to impact the "totalising discourse of ontology"<sup>35</sup>. So we do not have, as Heidegger might suggest, a world of liberated things and people. We have a world where things are certainly liberated but where people's liberty can only be attained, not as absolute liberty stemming from some ideological framework or systematic intellectualism, but, as a liberty that

results from a simultaneous making of liberal circumstance for others. Levinas addresses the very problematic of the contingency in all practice of our relations to others.

## CONCLUSION

Returning to the two examples of Baldeweg's library and Holl's church, the contingencies these buildings have responded to and articulated have been limited. The limits have been prescribed. The 'otherness' of the buildings has been limited, and the interior-exterior exchange reduced. Therefore, there seems to be no invitation for vigorous tectonic theorising, merely aesthetic admiration. If a building is to escape its own limits, to open itself up to the 'other', it cannot be indexed to singular specificity. It must still operate like an "abstract machine" so "it may construct a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality"<sup>36</sup>.

Tschumi's work still stands to remind us of the possibilities at the limits (figures 6 and 7). He says of his theory of disjunction, "at the limit, this research introduces preoccupations with the notion of 'subject' and with the role of 'subjectivity' in language, differentiating language as a system of signs from language as an act accomplished by an individual"<sup>37</sup>. Illustrating principles arising from phenomenology and hermeneutics he has recognised that speech, 'language-in-use', is the proper 'authentic' kind of language<sup>38</sup>. It is speech that gives first hand experience of knowledge. Even though Tschumi's narrative context is limited, architecture about architecture, and the individual who experiences Tschumi's 'cinematic promenade' has idealised subjectivity, that of [James] Joyce, [Georges] Bataille, or [Orson]




Fig. 8. *The Company of Dancers*, University of Edinburgh, "Tectonics and The Space of Communicativity", Brooklyn Heights Waterfront, New York, 2000.

Welles<sup>39</sup>, at least the project is open to some 'otherness'. There is a heavy-handed formalism behind many of his gestures, but the project is 'eventful'. Tectonics that permits the expression of difference occasioned by tectonic fragmentation, disjunction and assemblage has much to offer. The intervals in conditions of fragmentation can be understood in the Heideggerian sense as places of opening, to which cultural diversity always has invitation (figure 8). These are spaces where specificity can be multiplied. We must imagine the speaker of the architectural project. We must always assume the presence of the 'other'. The 'other' has greater freedom to operate in the interval of

difference. The 'other' as difference can always reside in the tectonics of architecture. Tectonics embodies the other in its narrative, suspended in the interval between explanation and understanding. "In the interval of the tale, the voice of the narrator can be heard with more or less appropriateness, sometimes fictive, sometimes without any mask"<sup>40</sup>. This is the 'space of communicativity'. In other words-it is a space where the subject, be it building, user or (architect) narrator, is not central to the manifestation. The subject is always merely marginal, either on the way in or the way out.



## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Post Modern-Condition, A Report on Knowledge*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979): xxv.
- <sup>2</sup> Examples of this are easily found: Canary Wharf, London where the locals had no say whatsoever in what became of their 'neighbourhood'; Frank Gehry's Bilbao Museum, where there was significant objection by the Basques to an imposition from central government.
- <sup>3</sup> The linguistic turn in philosophy takes different routes. For example, Lyotard makes reference to the linguistic turn referring specifically to Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Differend*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988): xiii. This paper moves principally along the Phenomenological and Hermeneutic routes, but Lyotard's reworking of Wittgenstein's notion of 'language games' colours the way.
- <sup>4</sup> Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelonas, "Semiotics and Architecture: Ideological Consumption or Theoretical Work", *Oppositions 1*, Princeton Architectural Press (1973): 93-100.
- <sup>5</sup> For example, Michael Baird, Geoffrey Broadbent, Peter Eisenman, Michael Graves, Charles Jencks, and Robert Venturi.
- <sup>6</sup> Lyotard and Wittgenstein. Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Post-Modern Condition*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979): 10.
- <sup>7</sup> Diana Agrest, "Representation as Articulation between Theory and Practice", *Stan Allen Essays, Practice, Architecture, Technique and Representation*, (Netherlands: G+B Arts International, 2000): 168.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p.164.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p.71.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p.65.
- <sup>11</sup> This list summarises the etymology of tectonics given by Frampton. Kenneth Frampton, *Studies in Tectonic Culture*, (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1995): 3-8.
- <sup>12</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, (London: The Athlone Press, 1988): 141.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.111-148.
- <sup>14</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, (New York: Harper Row, 1969); Jacques Derrida, "Différence", *Margins of Philosophy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982 [first published in 1972]).
- <sup>15</sup> According to Heidegger, *techné* has little to do with technology and nothing to do with means-to-end logic. The meaning of it "does not lie at all in making and manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in . . . revealing . . . *techné* is a bringing forth", *The Question Concerning Technology* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, Harper and Row, 1997): 13. Frampton also invokes Heidegger's notion of a space that "is in essence that for which room has been made", *Studies in Tectonic Culture*, p.22. However, curiously his point is not tectonic, it is topographical, maintaining a distinction between technique and location. It seems that Frampton too readily allows the reading of tectonics to be synonymous with technique or technology. For Frampton it is "a mode", a means, such that "parts of a given building may be rendered differently according to their ontological status", *Studies in Tectonic Culture*, (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1995): 23. This potentially maintains tectonic thinking as principally representational. This seems to miss Heidegger's point.
- <sup>16</sup> Sandro Marpillero, "Tectonic Masks", *LOTUS*, (Feb 2001): 52-74.
- <sup>17</sup> Juan Navarro Baldeweg describing his project for the extension to the Woolworth Conservatory at Princeton, as quoted by Sandro Marpillero, "Tectonic Masks", *LOTUS*, (Feb 2001): 52-74.
- <sup>18</sup> Cathryn Vasseleu, *Textures of Light, Vision and Touch in Irigary, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty*, (New York: Routledge, 1997): 12, quoted by Sandro Marpillero, "Tectonic Masks", *LOTUS*, (Feb 2001): 52-74.
- <sup>19</sup> Diana Agrest, "Representation as Articulation between Theory and Practice", *Stan Allen Essays, Practice, Architecture, Technique and Representation*, (Netherlands: G+B Arts International, 2000): 168. Agrest here refers to architecture's traditional techniques of image projection, e.g. perspective and orthographic projection.

- <sup>20</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer in conversation with Paul Ricoeur, Paul Ricoeur, "The Conflict of Interpretations: Debate with Hans Georg Gadamer", *A Ricoeur Reader, Reflection and Imagination* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991): 219.
- <sup>21</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Outside The Subject*, (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1994): 1.
- <sup>22</sup> This follows the phenomenological principle that gives "ontological precedence to the concept of difference", Dorian Wiszniewski and Richard Coyne, "Mask and Identity", *Building Virtual Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 205.
- <sup>23</sup> Colin Davis, *Levinas, An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996): 64. Davis refers to the exchange between Derrida and Levinas. Derrida responds to Levinas' *Totality and Infinity* (1961) with his *Violence and Metaphysics* (1964), and Levinas responds to this with his *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence* (1974).
- <sup>24</sup> Colin Davis, *Levinas, An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996): 66. Davis is quoting Étienne Feron, *De l'idée de transcendance à la question du langage: L'itinéraire philosophique d'Emmanuel Levinas*, Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1992.
- <sup>25</sup> Levinas in dialogue with Richard Kearney, in Richard Cohen, *Face to Face With Levinas* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986): 22.
- <sup>26</sup> "thought is . . . the blank part of the text . . . this thought, would still be walled-in within presence", Jacques Derrida, *A Derrida Reader, Between The Blinds*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991): 53.
- <sup>27</sup> Levinas in dialogue with Richard Kearney, in Richard Cohen, *Face to Face With Levinas* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986): 21.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>30</sup> Albert Rabil Jr., *Merleau Ponty, Existentialist of the Social World* (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1967): 40. The authors emphasis. The suggestion is that 'structures' can be substituted by 'tectonics'.
- <sup>31</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, "Meaning and Sense", *Collected Philosophical Papers* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987): 75.
- <sup>32</sup> Albert Rabil Jr., *Merleau Ponty, Existentialist of the Social World* (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1967): 40-41.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p.41.
- <sup>34</sup> Thomas Carl Wall, *Radical Passivity, Levinas, Blanchot, and Agamben* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999): 38-39.
- <sup>35</sup> Levinas in dialogue with Richard Kearney, in Richard Cohen, *Face to Face With Levinas* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986): 21.
- <sup>36</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, (London: The Athlone Press, 1988): 141.
- <sup>37</sup> Bernard Tschumi, *Architecture and Disjunction* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994): 109.
- <sup>38</sup> Norris, 1988, p. 10
- <sup>39</sup> Bernard Tschumi, *Architecture and Disjunction* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994): 211.
- <sup>40</sup> Maurice Blanchot, "The Narrative Voice", *The Station Hill Blanchot Reader* (New York: Station Hill Press/Barrytown Ltd., 1999): 462.

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